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Keith A. Wilson, University of Glasgow
Forthcoming in Charles Travis on Language, Thought, and Perception, 
 T. Dobler and J. Collins (eds.), Oxford University Press  
1. Introduction
Echoing Kant’s remark that “[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts  are  blind” (Kant  1998:  A51/B75),  Charles  Travis  (2004;  2013a)  argues  that 
perceptual  experiences  are  not  only  ‘blind’,  but  ‘silent’  in  that  they  have  no 
representational content at all. For Travis, the role of perceptual experience — by which 
he means conscious  perceptual experience — is  to present aspects of  the world upon 
which  truth  may  turn.  “In  perception,”  he  says,  “things  are  not  presented,  or 
represented, to us as being thus and so. They are just presented to us, full stop” (Travis 
2004:  65).  According  to  Travis,  then,  perception  is  presentational  in  that  it  makes 
perceptual  objects — for  example,  a  sunset,  or  the  sun’s  setting — available  to 
consciousness, but it is not in the business of representing that the sun is setting. The 
latter,  being  propositional,  is  not  an  object  of  perceptual  awareness,  but  rather  of 
thought or judgement (Travis 2013b). While propositional content may be constitutive 
of cognitive states typically thought of as ‘downstream’ from, or causally dependent 
upon, perceptual experience, assimilating perception to a state of this kind involves a 
kind of category mistake that renders thought’s purchase on the world unintelligible 
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(Travis 2007).
The view that perceptual experience is representational is common within both 
philosophy and cognitive science.  However,  it  is  rarely explicitly argued for in any 
detail.  According to this  view, for  S  to  perceptually experience the world in some 1
sensory modality, or combination of modalities, is for S’s experience to represent  the 
world  as  being  some  particular  way.  That  is  to  say,  perceptual  experiences  have 
representational  content.  In  ‘The  Silence  of  the  Senses’,  Travis  challenges  this 
orthodoxy  by  arguing  that  experiences  do  not  represent  the  world  as  being  any 
particular  way,  since  they  are,  in  an  important  sense,  equivocal  or  indeterminate 
between contents. Accordingly, though perception presents objects in an extensional 
sense by making them available to a conscious subject, it does not present them as being 
some way or other, and so is not a representational or intentional phenomenon (Travis 
2004: 93).
In this paper, I examine one of Travis’s arguments — the argument from looks (§2) —
 for the above claim in order to clarify the nature of the challenge that it poses for the 
representational view, as well as to highlight several possible lines of response. My aim 
here is not to defend Travis per se, but rather to elucidate the details of his argument in 
a way that avoids various misunderstandings which, I argue, have become prevalent in 
the literature (§3). Once these misunderstandings are corrected, the argument can be 
seen to pose an important and, in my view, unresolved challenge for many (though not 
all)  forms  of  representationalism (§4).  As  such,  Travis’s  argument  from looks  puts 
pressure on representationalists  to  explain not  only how experiences  come to  have 
representational content, and what that content is, but the explanatory role, or roles, 
 Examples of recent attempts to do so include Byrne (2009), Siegel (2010), Schellenberg (2011a; 1
2011b) and Brogaard (forthcoming).
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that such contents are supposed to play, along with how — or indeed whether — they 
are available to perceivers in thought and reasoning (§5).
2. Perceptual Representation
In  ‘The  Silence  of  the  Senses’,  Travis  (2004;  2013a)  targets  the  view  that  visual 
perceptual experience (hereafter: ‘experience’) constitutively involves, or is reducible 
to, the representation of mind-independent objects and their properties. The view that 
experiences  have  representational  content — variously  known  as  representationalism, 
intentionalism,  or  the  Content  View  — are  often  contrasted  with  the  view  that  such 2
experiences fundamentally involve a primitive or unanalysable relation to the objects 
of experience. Variations on the latter view — known as relationalism, Naïve Realism, or 
the Object View — differ in emphasis, but share a common commitment to the essentially 
relational  nature  of  experience.  Many  relationalists  deny  that  experience  can  be 3
analysed  in  representational  terms,  claiming  either  that  experience  is  non-
representational,  i.e.  anti-representationalism,  or  that  the  resulting  content  is 
explanatorily  redundant.  A  third  family  of  hybrid  or  ‘mixed’  views  holds  that 
experience possesses both representational and relational elements, thereby combining 
aspects of each of the preceding views. I do not consider such hybrid views in detail 
here except to say that insofar as they posit a representational element to experience, 
they are also targets for Travis’s argument.
 Not  to  be  confused with the  distinct,  but  related,  view that  the  phenomenal  character  of 2
experience  supervenes  upon,  or  is  identical  to,  its  representational  content,  also  commonly 
referred to as ‘intentionalism’ or, less frequently, ‘representationalism’.
 Campbell  (2002),  for  example,  characterises  experience  as  a  three-place  relation  between 3
subject,  object  and  some  particular  standpoint  or  perspective,  whereas  Martin  (2002,  2006) 
emphasises the constitutive role of external objects in experience.
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The notion of representation that Travis opposes — or p-representation, as I will call 
it, intended to be suggestive of ‘perceptual representation’ — may be contrasted with 
other forms of representation that he explicitly allows. Causal covariation, for example, 
as occurs when light falls upon the retina forming an image of some external scene, 
might be thought to constitute a kind of representation, albeit one that is incapable of 
misrepresenting except by externally imposed convention (see below). Similarly, the 
rings in a tree’s trunk might be said to represent the tree’s age, though the content of 
this representation is imputed by us, as conscious observers, and not by the tree or its 
rings. Here again it seems inapt to talk of misrepresentation if — due to freak weather 
conditions, for example — the tree’s age and number of rings fail to coincide. Rather, 
the  rings  might  simply  be  said  not  to  represent  its  age.  Alternatively,  we  might 
represent the tree’s rings as not indicating its age, where this further representation is 
distinct from the rings themselves. In any case, ‘representation’ functions here as a kind 
of shorthand that indicates the presence of a particular kind of cause. Call such forms 
of representation effect-representation.
The possibility of misrepresentation typically involves an appeal to some kind of 
standard function, or norm. Scientific explanations of the workings of various parts of 
the  brain,  such  as  the  visual  cortex  or  optic  nerve,  might  invoke  the  notion  of 
representation  in  describing  states  or  processes  that  carry  information  about  some 
external  stimulus  or  subsystem.  Here,  the  relevant  brain  system may enter  a  state 
normally associated with a specific cause as a result of a deviant chain of events — for 
example, by direct stimulation with an electrode — thereby creating the possibility for 
misrepresentation. Even where such representations casually impact upon the subject’s 
experience, however, their contents need not feature as the content of any personal-
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level cognitive state; i.e. they may be entirely sub-personal. Travis’s argument does not 
rule out the existence of sub-personal representations, nor is his view (pace Burge 2005) 
incompatible with modern psychological or neuroscientific explanations of perception. 
Rather,  the argument targets  a  distinctly philosophical  conception of  representation 
that  is  held  by  many,  though not  all,  philosophers  who take  conscious  perceptual 
experience to be representational.
To gain a clearer understanding of the kind of representation that Travis has in 
mind, it is helpful to examine the conditions by which he characterises it, which he 
summarises as follows (Travis 2004: 63; the labels are my own):
(i) Objectivity: “The representation in question consists in representing things as so 
(thus, truly/veridically, or falsely/non-veridically).”
(ii) Face Value: “It has, or gives perceptual experience, a face value, at which it can be 
taken or declined (or discounted).”
(iii) Givenness:  “It  is  not  autorepresentation  [representation-by  the  subject].  (It  is 
allorepresentation [representation-to the subject], though here, not crucially.)”
(iv) Availability: “When we are thus represented to, we can recognize that, and how, 
this is so; most pertinently, we can appreciate what it is that is thus represented to 
us as so.”
These necessary, though not sufficient, conditions are intended to capture the particular 
flavour of representation that Travis attributes to his opponents, who include Martin 
Davies, Gilbert Harman, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Christopher Peacocke, John 
Searle,  and Michael  Tye,  to name but a few (ibid.  58).  To this we might add Byrne 
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(2009), Siegel (2010) and Brogaard (2010), as well as Schellenberg (2011a, 2011b), who 
defends a hybrid view comparable to Tye’s (2007) phenomenal externalism.
Travis’s use of “representing things as so” in (i) might be taken to suggest that p-
representation must be conceptually structured, rather than non-conceptual. However, 
since  two of  his  stated  targets — namely,  Peacocke  (1992)  and Tye  (1995) — endorse 
forms of non-conceptual content, we can assume that Travis intends for his argument 
to apply to both conceptual and non-conceptual views. Similarly, while the wording of 
(i) and (ii) might suggest that perceptual content must be propositional, i.e. assessable 
for truth or falsity, a broader interpretation of Objectivity admits of any form of content 
possessing accuracy conditions — a notion that admits of varying degrees — in relation 
to the states of mind-independent objects and their properties. , 4 5
In  what  follows,  I  will  be  primarily  concerned  with  Travis’s  Face  Value  and 
Availability  conditions, both of which are central to his argument from looks. Before 
presenting the details of this argument,  it  will  therefore be useful to examine these 
conditions in greater detail, along with some of the considerations that motivate them.
2.1. Face Value
Part of representationalism’s appeal stems from the intuitive idea that every experience 
has a single and determinate ‘face value’ at which it may be accepted or declined, as 
captured by Travis’s Face Value condition.  It follows from this conception of experience 6
 For a representationalist view that denies this broader interpretation, see Glüer (2009).4
 I examine whether the argument may be successfully extended to non-propositional content in 5
§3.1 below.
 ‘Determinate’  is  used here  in  the  sense  that  is  opposed to  determinable,  and concerns  the 6
assignment of contents to experience, rather than the determinacy of that content. The above 
claim is therefore compatible with the contents of experience being indeterminate in the sense 
that they have vague, i.e. non-determinate, accuracy conditions.
Final draft – please do not cite or quote without permission
Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks "                                                                          7
that experiences must convey some particular ‘way’, or state of affairs, that things are 
perceived as being, i.e. a representational content, capturing the conditions according 
to  which  that  experience  may  be  considered  accurate  or  veridical.  To  accept  an 
experience at face value is to judge that things are the way that they appear. To decline 
its  face  value,  or  to  withhold  judgement,  is  to  doubt  or  remain  neutral  about  the 
veridicality of one’s experience, respectively — as might occur after having knowingly 
taken  a  hallucinogenic  drug,  or  when wearing  inverting  lenses,  for  example.  Such 
content  is  typically  thought  of  as  being  systematically  related,  or  identical,  to  the 
contents of perceptual judgements or beliefs that it would be natural for the subject to 
form  of  the  basis  of  that  experience  (cf.  Siegel  2010:  51).  Crucially,  however, 
perceptually experiencing  the world as φ  does not commit the subject to believing φ, 
though it might predispose them towards forming such a belief. On the present view, 
then, experience is distinct from judgement and belief simpliciter,  and functions as a 
non-factive propositional attitude in its own right (Byrne 2009: 437).
The  idea  that  experiences  have  face-value  content  might  seem so  obvious  or 
compelling to some that it can be difficult to understand how it could possibly be false. 
One way of rejecting Face Value,  however, is to deny that experience has content in 
favour of the view that such content only arises when a subject judges, or otherwise 
interprets, her experience as indicating that something is the case. Such a view need 
not deny that  perceptual  beliefs  have contents which are derived from, or causally 
dependent  upon,  experience.  Rather,  the  claim  is  that  the  resulting  content  is  not 
derived  from,  or  identical  to,  a  content  of  experience,  since  experiences  are  not 
themselves representational. Thus, whatever tokening of content the representationalist 
takes to occur at the level of experience may be taken by the anti-representationalist to 
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occur ‘downstream’ of experience at the level of judgement or interpretation.  On the 7
standard assumption that  belief  is  explanatorily subsequent to experience,  then the 
latter has no content independently of the former. This is Travis’s view.
A second way of rejecting Face Value is to deny that experiences have only one 
such  content  in  favour  of  them  having  many  contents;  i.e.  content  pluralism  (cf. 
Chalmers 2006; Crane 2013). In this case, Travis’s argument may be applied iteratively 
to  each  individual  content  that  the  content  pluralist  takes  experience  to  have. 
Alternatively, one might hold that experiences have disjunctive contents — for example, 
that a given visual experience represents there to be a reddish-roundish-patch or a ball 
or  a  tomato,  and so on,  where each disjunct specifies some particular way that the 
world might be. This view, however, is compatible with Face Value,  since the entire 
disjunction as a whole may form the face-value content of experience, and so what is 
‘given’ in perception. Whilst Travis (2004: 72–73) raises doubts as to the aptness of the 
disjunctive characterisation, his argument may also be taken to target views according 
to which experiences have disjunctive contents (cf. §3.1).8
2.2. Availability
Travis’s notion of “recognizing”, or availability as I will call it, is undoubtedly the most 
contentious of  his  four conditions,  and admittedly less  precise  or  explicit  than one 
might hope. I take it, however, that this condition is motivated by constraints arising 
from Face Value and Givenness, since for an experience to have a face value that is given 
to the subject in perception, its content must in some sense be cognitively available to 
that  subject  such  that  they  can  accept  or  decline  it.  Were  this  not  the  case  then, 
 Mutatis mutandis for non-conceptual and/or non-propositional contents.7
 Not to be confused with disjunctivism, which Travis endorses.8
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assuming that they were able to form any beliefs at all,  subjects would simply find 
themselves ‘saddled with’ (to borrow McDowell’s term) beliefs about their perceptual 
environment  without  any  means  of  consciously  registering  or  reflecting  upon  the 
content  of  their  experiences,  thus  making  accepting  or  declining  that  content 
impossible.  Aside from special  cases such as blindsight,  this  is  not  how perceptual 
experience  strikes  us,  and,  more  importantly  for  present  purposes,  it  is  not  how 
proponents of representationalism characterise their view, since it effectively collapses 
p-representation into a form of sub-personal effect-representation.
Availability, then, has two main features. First, it requires the face-value content of 
experience to be “recognizable”, or cognitively available, to the subject on the grounds 
that  “you  cannot  represent  things  to  people  as  so  in  a  way  they  simply  cannot 
recognize as doing that” (Travis 2004: 63). By extension, then, experiences recognisably 
involve some form of representation. Moreover, such content cannot be the result of the 
subject  representing  to  themselves  that  something  is  so  —  what  Travis  calls 
“autorepresentation”  (ibid.  61) — as  in  judgement  or  belief.  Rather,  the  content  is 
supposedly ‘given’ to the subject in perception, i.e. “allorepresentation” (ibid.), as per 
Travis’s  Givenness  condition.  Precisely  what  the  relevant  availability  amounts  to 
requires further specification, but I take the minimal requirement to be that, for any 
given  experience,  perceivers  must  be  capable  of  grasping  how  that  experience 
represents the world as being — or, to put it another way, what it would take for that 
experience to be accurate or veridical. P-representational content is therefore content for 
the subject.
The  second  notable  feature  of  Availability  is  that  it  requires  the  content  of 
experience  to  be  available  (in  the  relevant  sense)  to  the  subject  in  virtue  of  the 
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corresponding  experience.  This  qualification  is  intended  to  rule  out  conscious 
availability  through  some  further  state,  such  as  a  judgement  or  belief,  that  is 
independent of, or explanatorily subsequent to, the experience in question. As noted 
above,  it  is  entirely  compatible  with  Travis’s  view that  judgements  or  beliefs  have 
representational  content,  though  those  contents  do  not  constitute  p-representation 
since they contravene Givenness. Rather, what is at issue is whether experience per se 
possesses  content,  since  if  such  content  were  only  recognisable  in  virtue  of  some 
further non-experiential state, then it could equally be claimed that the relevant content 
should be attributed to that further state and not to experience.
Availability does not, however, require subjects to be routinely aware that they are 
being represented to, nor that they are capable of reporting the nature or contents of 
their  experiences — something  that  clearly  requires  a  degree  of  philosophical  and 
conceptual sophistication that may be lacking in many, or indeed most, subjects. Nor 
does it require perceivers to be capable of accurately determining whether the relevant 
accuracy conditions obtain, since they may be subject to some systematic practical or 
epistemic  disadvantage,  such  as  experiencing  a  persistent  illusion  or  hallucination. 
Rather, in order to p-represent that x is ψ, the subject must be capable of grasping both 
(i) what it would be for x to be ψ, and (ii) that the relevant experience conveys that x is 
ψ,  even  if  on  reflection  they  go  on  to  judge  things  to  be  otherwise.  The  relevant 
grasping  may  be  tacit  or  implicit,  and  need  not  involve  any  explicit  thought  or 
knowledge that is attributable to the subject. Nevertheless, content must be tokened in 
a way that is capable of featuring in the subject’s reasoning such that they could form a 
conscious judgement or belief, or rationally justify such a belief, on the basis of it if 
required.
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The precise formulation of this requirement is delicate since one would not want 
to rule out the use of, for example, introspection or conceptual capacities, the exercise 
of which enables subjects to token or introspect the contents of experience, provided 
that  such  capacities  were  not  themselves  what  gave  experience  its  content 
independently of perception. In particular, subjects should not merely infer the contents 
of experience on the basis of, for example, background beliefs or prior learning in a 
way that is compatible with the denial of representationalism. To avoid such problems, 
we can gloss Travis’s condition as follows:
Availability*: The representational nature and content of p-representations must 
be “recognizable”, or cognitively available, to the subject solely in virtue 
of the corresponding perceptual experience, along with the operation of 
those non-representational capacities necessary to facilitate such 
availability.
It remains an important question whether a version of the above condition would 
be  acceptable  to  Travis’s  opponents,  since  much  of  his  argument  depends  on  it. 
However,  some  version  of  the  condition  does  feature  in  many  representationalist 
accounts  of  experience.  According  to  Siegel’s  ‘Content  View’,  for  example,  “the 
contents of an experience are conveyed to the subject by her experience” (Siegel 2010: 28; 
emphasis  added),  whilst  Byrne (2009:  443)  takes  experiences  to  be belief-like  states 
whose  contents  are  available  to  the  subject  on  the  basis  of  how  things  non-
comparatively look (see §4.3). Nevertheless, it remains open to the representationalist 
to reject this condition, perhaps on the grounds that it over-intellectualises the nature of 
perception (cf. Burge 2010), thus generating a possible response to Travis. I discuss the 
consequences of this view in §5 below, though Travis (2004: 84–93) also gives a separate 
Final draft – please do not cite or quote without permission
Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks "                                                                        12
argument against such views that I do not discuss here.
For  the  sake  of  argument,  however,  I  will  assume  the  above  reading  of 
Availability,  though the  details  are  no  doubt  controversial  and may require  further 
glossing to make this condition acceptable to proponents of the target view. However, 
since Availability, or something very like it, is entailed by Face Value and Givenness, then 
the onus lies with the representationalist to give a satisfactory account of it.
3. The Argument from Looks
Travis’s argument from looks, as I will call it, is just one of the arguments in what is an 
extremely  rich  and  complex  paper  (Travis  2004;  2013a).  In  it,  Travis  aims  to 
demonstrate that the notion of p-representation that I sketch above can play no role in 
a satisfactory philosophical theory of perception. If effective, this has the potential to 
rule  out  a  range  of  widely  held  views  concerning  the  role  and  existence  of 
representational  content  in  visual  experience,  and  by  extension  all  other  forms  of 
perception. Note that this leaves it open whether other forms of representation, such as 
effect-representation, may be attributed to perceptual states (though not to experiences, 
since it is the attribution of content at the conscious level to which Travis is opposed). 
Nevertheless, such a position would constitute a substantial weakening of the target 
view, and so still represents an important victory for Travis. The argument thus poses 
an important challenge to the representational view, though one that, as I argue in §5, 
may ultimately prove surmountable.
Travis’s  argumentative  strategy  is  relatively  straightforward. 
Representationalists, he claims, are committed to experiences being p-representational. 
The evidence for this comes from representationalists’ own descriptions of the view, 
which I will not rehearse here (see Travis 2004: 58–60). However, Travis argues, the 
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conditions  for  p-representation  cannot  be  jointly  satisfied,  since  Face  Value  and 
Availability  are  mutually  incompatible.  Hence  visual  experiences  cannot  be  p-
representational, and so representationalism is false.9
The argument itself is as follows:
P1 If visual experiences were p-representational then their content would be         
recognisable in virtue of how, in experience, things perceptually appear, 
or look [to the subject].  (Looks-indexing)10
P2 Visual looks are incapable of making p-representational content         
recognisable since they are comparative and so equivocal between 
multiple contents.
P3 Thinkable looks are incapable of making p-representational content         
recognisable since they are not wholly perceptual.
P4 There is no further notion of looks that is both wholly perceptual and         
capable of making p-representational content recognisable.
C1 (From P2 through P4) The content of visual experiences cannot be        
recognisable on the basis of how things look [to the subject].
C2 (From P1 and C1) Visual experiences are not p-representational.       
Travis’s first premise makes the pro tem assumption that the most plausible way 
 For  alternative  formulations  of  the  argument,  see  Brogaard  (forthcoming)  and  Raleigh 9
(forthcoming).
 Slightly different versions of the argument may be derived depending on whether or not 10
appearances or looks are taken to be subject-specific, as indicated by the bracketed phrase in P1 
and C1, with versions of the following responses and objections similarly derived for each.
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for  the  representationalist  to  satisfy  Availability  is  for  experiential  content  to  be 
recognisable to the subject — or “indexed” to use Travis’s term (ibid. 63) — on the basis 
of how things visually appear, or look.  This suggestion has prima facie  plausibility 11
since  how one tells  what  the  face-value  content  of  one’s  experience  is  presumably 
depends  upon  the  look,  or  visual  appearance,  that  is  manifested  via  the 
phenomenology  of  experience.  That  is  not  to  say  that  appearances  must  be 
representational,  or are to be identified with the contents of experience.  Rather,  the 
suggestion is  that  looks  enable  us  to  recognise  such contents,  in  turn making them 
available to consciousness. Thus, what fixes or determines p-representational content 
and what makes that content recognisable may be two different things — the former 
consideration  being  semantic,  the  latter  epistemic.  Whilst  Travis  does  not  always 
adequately distinguish between these two aspects of experience, Availability and Looks-
indexing, i.e. P1, clearly concern the latter.
Premises two through four are concerned with the various kinds of looks that 
might perform such indexing, thereby making the resulting content available to the 
subject in the sense described above (§2.2). Here, Travis identifies two distinct notions 
of  appearance:  “visual”  and “thinkable”  looks,  arguing  that  neither  is  capable  of 12
making p-representational content recognisable since the former contravenes Face Value 
(P2)  and the  latter  Availability  (P3).  From this,  along  with  what  Travis  takes  to  be 
conflicting  constraints  arising  from  those  two  conditions  (P4),  he  concludes  that 
experiences  cannot  be  looks-indexed  (C1),  and  so  visual  perception  is  not  p-
representational  (C2).  Assuming  that  vision  provides  the  strongest  case  for  the 
 I take looks to be visual appearances, and so use these terms interchangeably.11
 I use the revised terminology of Travis (2013a) in preference to “looking like” and “looking as 12
if” (Travis 2004) for reasons described in §4.3 below.
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attribution of p-representational content, this result may be taken to generalise to all 
forms of perceptual experience, though Travis leaves this final step implicit.
The argument from looks thus aims to present the representationalist with the 
following dilemma. To defend their view, they must either:
(a) elucidate some notion of looks that is  capable of making the relevant content 
available — something that Travis argues is impossible — by rejecting one of P2 
through P4, or
(b) reject  Looks-indexing,  or  one  of  Travis’s  other  conditions  for  p-representation, 
resulting in a substantial weakening of, and potentially undermining, their view.
To understand why this dilemma is pressing, however, it is necessary to gain a clearer 
understanding of Travis’s notions of  “visual” and “thinkable” looks, along with the 
reason  why  he  thinks  that  no  other  notion  of  looks  is  capable  of  meeting  the 
representationalist’s requirements.
3.1 Visual looks
Visual  looks,  or  looksv  for  short,  are  characteristic  ways  of  appearing  exhibited  by 
objects in virtue of their visual effects upon the perceiver. Looksv thus identify some 
visually detectable appearance that  is  generated by all  of  the things which share a 
given look (Travis 2004: 69–70). For an object to lookv like a lemon is therefore for it to 
have the characteristic visual look that lemons typically (though not always) have — 
call this looking lemonish. Since looksv may be characterised in terms of an implicit or 
explicit comparison between objects that look like, or resemble, one another, they are 
commonly described (e.g. by Chisholm 1957: 45) as comparative looks.
To  see  why  this  yields  a  problem  for  the  representationalist,  consider  the 
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following example. Many things, not all of which are lemons, share the property of 
looking lemonish. Moreover, anything that looksv, in the relevant respect, like a lemon 
also looksv  like  a  wax imitation lemon,  or,  to  the untrained eye under appropriate 
circumstances, like an unripe lime, a lemon-shaped bar of soap, a hollowed-out lemon 
façade, a cartoon drawing of a lemon, and so on. Thus, for all that something might 
lookv  lemonish,  there are innumerable ways that  the world might actually be,  all  of 
which share that same visual appearance. Crucially, such resemblance relationships are 
symmetrical. Thus, if something looksv like a lemon, then a lemon also looksv like it. 
Each  of  these  alternatives  corresponds  to  a  set  of  conditions  under  which  the 
experience  may  be  considered  accurate  or  veridical,  and  so  constitutes  a  distinct 
representational  content  in its  own right.  As far  as  visual  looks go,  then,  the same 
experience might equally be said to represent any, or indeed all, of the innumerable 
ways in which it can lookv to me just like there is a lemon before me; e.g. that there is a 
wax lemon, hollowed out lemon-façade, and so on.
It follows from this, argues Travis, that nothing about an object’s lookingv ψ can 
identify the content of that experience as representing ψ; e.g. that something is a lemon, 
as opposed to one of its visually indistinguishable alternatives, or ‘ringers’. What goes 
for lemons goes for peccaries, ovals, and blueness (Travis 2004: 73). In each case, the 
relevant lookv is also exhibited by a host of ringers, which in the preceding cases would 
include pigs, circles seen obliquely, and white things cleverly illuminated by blue light, 
respectively. Thus, looksv “do not decide any particular representational content for any 
given experience to have” (ibid. 69), and so fail to satisfy Face Value. Rather, visual looks 
are  equivocal  between contents,  and so incapable  of  making any one such content 
recognisable, as per P2.
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One possible response to this line of argument is as follows:
Response 1: Experiences do not represent concrete states of affairs — for example, 
there being a lemon, something yellow, ovoid, etc. — but rather 
something’s merely appearing lemonish (yellowish, ovoid, etc.) in a way 
that may be satisfied by any sufficiently lemon-like object, or combination 
of objects, that exhibits the relevant appearance.
One way to flesh out this response would be to posit a notion of appearances that 
lay somewhere between a purely subjective effect upon the perceiver, which violates 
Objectivity  (see  below),  and  the  representation  of  the  appearance-independent 
properties of external objects, such as their shape, colour, and so on.  Consequently, 13
the resulting content relates to what we might call appearance properties: looking lemonish, 
looking yellow, and so on. Such properties are strictly neutral on which external objects 
and properties give rise to the appearance, thus severely limiting what perception can 
tell  us  about  the  external  world.  This  approach  also  contradicts  the  standard 
representationalist  account of  appearances,  according to which for some object  o  to 
look F is for the subject to represent o as being F, rather than representing o as having 
the property of (merely) appearing F — call this F′. Thus, rather than appearances being 
a function of the relevant propositional attitude, e.g. seeing or experiencing, they enter 
into the content of the experience itself. Arguably, such content can tell us little about 
the appearance-independent properties of external objects since any object can, with 
sufficient setup, instantiate F′, even if it doesn’t instantiate the property that typically 
causes it, namely F. Even if the response works, then, which is doubtful, it comes at 
considerable ontological and epistemic cost.
 Travis goes on to deny that there could be any such intermediate notion (see §3.3).13
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Alternatively, if looksv are taken to be purely subjective, this raises the question of 
which cases are to count as veridical. If experiences merely represent that, for example, 
o looks F, then this will be true, and so veridical, of any object exhibiting the relevant 
look, potentially extending to cases of illusion and even hallucination (assuming that 
the latter are taken to represent some non-standard object, such as a brain state). This 
again weakens the explanatory role of p-representation, in the worst case making the 
relevant content necessarily veridical, since every case in which an object looksv F to S 
will  be  one in  which it  is  (veridically)  represented by S  as  having the property of 
lookingv F, i.e. F′. In the absence of some further factor or mechanism that determines 
how the world would need to be in order for that experience to be veridical,  such 
contents are effectively self-verifying. As such, they are only capable of indexing ‘thin’ 
or  narrow  content  concerning  the  state  of  the  subject’s  visual  system,  or  visual 
phenomenology,  and  not  some  state  of  the  external  world,  thus  contravening 
Objectivity (cf. Byrne 2009: 449–50). But this what looksv were supposed to be doing, so 
either they are redundant, since they fail to explain how Availability can be met, or, if 
they do not  do this  job,  then they are a form of  sub-personal  effect-representation. 
Either way, Looks-indexing fails.14
A more palatable alternative is that just one of the many possible contents — being 
a  lemon,  for  example — is  somehow  singled  out  as  the  face  value  of  the  relevant 
experience. In this case, the representationalist needs to explain what privileges that 
content over all of the visually indistinguishable alternatives, or indeed the disjunction 
of all these alternatives, as the content of experience. Moreover, this explanation must 
make it possible for the subject to recognise that their experience represents this and 
 A similar  argument  may be  found in  Travis  (2005:  310)  concerning  the  extension  of  the 14
concept red.
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not some ringer, and so can presumably can only draw upon facts that are available to 
subject  at  the  first-personal  level.  Either  way,  what  started  out  as  the  seemingly 
intuitive  and  straightforward  notion  that  experiences  ‘represent’  the  properties  of 
objects  in  the  world  requires  considerable  further  explanation  and/or  theoretical 
machinery to ground the relevant content in information that is perceptually available 
to the subject, if indeed this is possible (see §5).
3.2 Thinkable looks
Whereas visual looks relate to resemblances between objects, thinkable looks are “very 
much a matter of what can be gathered from, or what is suggested by, the facts at hand, 
or those visibly (audibly, etc.) on hand” (Travis 2004: 76). Thinkable looks, or lookst for 
short,  are epistemic looks (cf. Chisholm 1957: 44). These relate to some particular way 
that the world could be that is associated with the relevant visual appearance, and so 
are  ideally  suited to  making p-representational  content  recognisable.  Indeed,  lookst 
arguably just are those contents that visual experiences incline a perceiver to judge or 
believe under the circumstances (cf. Travis 2004: 77). It is doubtful, however, that the 
contents which are indexed by, or identical to, lookst are apparent to the subject solely 
in virtue of what is perceptually available in experience, as Availability requires.
For example, if Arvo sees what he takes to be a lemon in front of him, then the 
relevant object lookst to him as if it is a lemon. But for all that, he might equally have 
taken the same object to be a lemon-shaped bar of soap had he enjoyed a qualitatively 
indistinguishable experience of it in a different context — upon walking into a chemist’s 
shop, for example. This is presumably not due to any difference in visual information 
about the object that is available to him in the relevant experience, but a matter of what 
he takes to be the case on the basis of that visual information. (That both objects look to 
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Arvo  like  lemons  is  irrelevant  here,  since  this  is  a  fact  about  Arvo’s  subjective 
experience that is not answerable to any mind-independent property of the external 
world,  and  so  fails  to  satisfy  Objectivity,  as  discussed  above.)  Rather,  what  differs 
between the two situations is not how things perceptually appear to Arvo, but what he 
is inclined to infer  on the basis of his total  evidence under the circumstances.  Such 
inferences are arguably a matter of judgement or interpretation, and not of experience, 
which  can  (according  to  standard  assumptions)  only  convey  how  things  visually 
(audibly,  tactually,  etc.)  appear.  It  is  therefore difficult  to see how experience could 
enable the subject to discern which of these perceptually indistinguishable possibilities 
is represented therein.
Lookst  are  a  form of  representation  whose  contents,  Travis  (2004:  76)  argues, 
cannot be ‘given’ in perception since they are already accepted by the subject as being 
true. Consequently, lookst are in danger of collapsing into, on the one hand, belief or 
judgement (i.e.  “autorepresentation”)  or,  on the other,  merely “indicating” (ibid.  67) 
what  is  expected  under  the  circumstances,  taking  all  the  available  evidence  into 
account.  Whilst  this  is  presumably part  of  the  intended role  of  p-representation,  it 
cannot be what makes perceptual content recognisable for the reason given above: it is 
not a (wholly) perceptual phenomenon, but an epistemic one. If, per impossibile, lookst 
were what made the contents of experiences recognisable, then they would do so in 
virtue of a state — namely, belief — that is, by all accounts, explanatorily subsequent to 
experience,  since  lookst  themselves  depend  upon  the  subject’s  background  beliefs. 
Thus, the content of experience would be recognisable in virtue of some further state 
that  is  supposedly  formed  on  the  basis  of  experience,  and  not  in  virtue  of  the 
experience itself, thereby contravening Availability and potentially generating a regress.
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It may seem unproblematic to some representationalists (cf. Siegel 2010: 51) for 
the relevant content to be recognisable in virtue of beliefs or other states ‘downstream’ 
of experience. However, this cannot form part of an argument for the existence of p-
representational  content  since  it  reverses  the  desired order  of  explanation — i.e.  the 
contents of beliefs are supposed to depend upon the content of experience, and not the 
other way around — as well as contravening both Givenness and Face Value. Moreover, 
as  noted  above,  that  beliefs  are  representational  is  common  ground  between 
representationalists  and  their  opponents,  and  so  neutral  between  the  two  views. 
Consequently,  lookst  cannot  be  what  make  p-representational  content  recognisable 
since the information that determines what is  represented according to them is not 
available to the subject in virtue of how things perceptually appear. Thus, lookst are not 
wholly perceptual, as per P3.
3.3 Looks-indexing
If we rule out both looksv and lookst as being what makes the content of experience 
available, an obvious further question arises: could not some other notion of looks or 
appearances do the job of indexing p-representational content? After all, as yet we have 
no reason to think that Travis’s two notions of looks are exhaustive. Travis goes on to 
claim in P4, however, that no such ‘hybrid’ notion of looks is possible.
Travis’s  argument  for  this  point  is  that  while  Availability  pushes  the 
representationalist towards looksv, which contravene Face Value, Face Value itself pushes 
the  representationalist  towards  lookst,  which  contravene  Availability.  Thus,  either 
(a) appearances are wholly perceptual, in which case they fail to pick out any particular 
way that the world must be in order for things to look the way they do, and so are 
equivocal between contents, i.e. P2, or (b) appearances index (or are identical to) the 
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contents of epistemic states that are supposedly derived from experience, in which case 
they are univocal, but not wholly perceptual, since the information that is perceptually 
available to the subject is insufficient to identify the relevant content, as per P3. The 
dual constraints of Face Value and Availability are therefore in tension with one another 
in such a way that they cannot be jointly satisfied by any one notion of looks. If this is 
right, then there can be no intermediate or hybrid notion of looks that satisfies both 
constraints,  as  per  P4,  since  the  very  idea  of  a  univocal,  objective  and  wholly 
perceptual  look is  itself  incoherent.  Nevertheless,  some of  Travis’s  critics,  including 
Byrne (2009) and Schellenberg (2011b), argue that:
Response 2: Some further, e.g. ‘non-comparative’ or ‘phenomenal’, notion of looks 
is capable of satisfying both Face Value and Looks-indexing.15
I consider this approach in §4.3 below. However, if Travis is right that these conditions 
are  irreconcilable,  then  experiences  cannot  be  looks-indexed,  and  so  P1  must  be 
rejected, yielding a further response to the argument:
Response 3: Reject Looks-indexing.
This  brings  us  to  the  second  horn  of  Travis’s  dilemma  on  which  the 
representationalist  now  faces  the  difficulty  of  specifying  how,  if  not  in  virtue  of 
appearances,  Availability  might  be  satisfied,  or  else  of  justifying  dropping  this 
apparently  plausible  condition  on  p-representation.  Rejecting  Availability  outright, 
however,  makes  it  difficult  to  claim  any  substantive  explanatory  role  for 
representational content at the level of experience, thus calling into question the very 
 Byrne  (2009)  also  claims  to  reject  Looks-indexing,  though  it  is  unclear  that  he  takes  this 15
condition to play the role that is described here.
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notion  of  p-representation.  Rejecting  Face  Value  or  any  of  Travis’s  other  conditions 
similarly threatens to weaken or undermine the view (see §5).
Travis’s dilemma is pressing in part because it is difficult to see what else could 
take  the  place  of  Looks-indexing  in  making  p-representational  content  recognisable, 
though alternative options are available. As I argue in §5, however, both of the above 
responses  place  a  substantial  explanatory  burden  upon  the  representationalist  that 
cannot  be  easily  discharged  in  a  way  that  decisively  favours  their  view  over  a 
competing  anti-representationalist  explanation  of  the  contents  of  perceptual 
judgements or beliefs.
4. Some Common Misinterpretations
Having established the overall structure of Travis’s argument, I now wish to examine 
some putative objections to it, each involving some misunderstanding that has become 
prevalent in the literature, along with how one might respond to them. These concern 
(i) the semantics of ‘looks’, (ii) the individuation of perceptual content, and (iii) ’non-
comparative’ or phenomenal looks, respectively.
4.1. The semantic objection
A number of commentators — notably Byrne (2009) and Siegel (2010) — take Travis’s 
argument  to  concern the semantics  of  the term ‘looks’  and its  cognates.  Siegel,  for 
example,  discusses the following objection to the representational  view: “No actual 
uses of looks (or looks F) and its cognates in ordinary English exclusively track what is 
presented in experience” (ibid. 59). Siegel attributes a version of this objection to Travis, 
who she  claims “raises  doubts  that  any actual  uses  of  looks  [sic]  in  English  report 
contents of visual perceptual experience” (ibid. 60). However, as should be clear from 
Final draft – please do not cite or quote without permission
Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks "                                                                        24
the above formulation, Travis’s argument concerns the metaphysics and epistemology 
of  appearances,  and not  the semantics  of  ‘looks’  in English or  any other language. 
Consequently, even if there were no use of ‘looks’ that tracked the alleged contents, the 
argument would still stand. That we sometimes describe experiences using terms like 
‘looks’, ‘appears’, and so on, is therefore beside the point.
Byrne (2009) similarly takes Travis to be making a semantic point, claiming that 
“Travis is wrong to conclude that our ordinary talk provides no support for (CV) [the 
content view]” (ibid. 444). Byrne rebuts the alleged conclusion by arguing that “we use 
‘looks’ to convey information about the non-comparative looks of things”, which he 
identifies with “the familiar ‘phenomenal use’” of ‘looks’ (ibid. 441; cf. §4.3). However, 
this again misunderstands the role that looks play in Travis’s argument. The point is 
not that our everyday looks-talk fails to support CV, but that perceptual appearances 
are unsuited to making p-representational content available. Appearances, or looks, are 
(according to Travis) either equivocal or non-perceptual, neither of which can explain 
the availability of perceptual content to the subject.
No doubt these misunderstandings are in part due to Travis’s (2004) identifying 
thinkable looks via the English locution “looks as if” in the indicative mood, and visual 
looks with “looks like”, which is typically (though not always) comparative. As Travis 
notes, the issue is complicated by the fact that each of these phrases can be used to 
signify  either  comparative  or  epistemic  looks,  effectively  making  them  ambiguous 
between Travis’s two notions. The argument from looks, however, does not turn on 
these linguistic points, and the terminology is subsequently replaced in Travis (2013a), 
which uses “visual” and “thinkable looks” to identify the relevant notions. However, 
even in the original version of his paper, Travis states that he means “to point to usage 
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to distinguish two notions of looks” and that “[w]hat matters is that we are conscious 
of the differences between these notions when it comes to asking just what notion of 
looks  might  serve  a  representationalist’s  purpose”  (2004:  75–76).  To  reject  Travis’s 
critique on the basis of whether English usage tracks, or otherwise, the relevant notions 
therefore  fails  to  engage  with  the  substance  of  his  argument  which  concerns  the 
metaphysics and epistemology of appearances, and not the semantics of ‘looks’.
4.2. The triviality objection
A second misinterpretation of Travis’s argument is that it concerns what determines, or 
individuates, the content of perceptual experience, rather than what makes that content 
recognisable.  According  to  this  version  of  the  argument,  Travis  aims  to  show that 
appearances, as manifested via visual phenomenology, underdetermine the content of 
experience, and so cannot be what fixes that content (cf. Burge 2010: 344). However, 
few, if any, representationalists take appearances to play this role, in part for that very 
reason. Indeed, representationalists generally hold the order of explanation to be the 
other way around, and that it is representational content that determines perceptual 
appearances or phenomenology (i.e. intentionalism), and not vice versa. The objection, 
then, is that Travis merely seeks to establish what is already common ground between 
him and his opponents. Hence even if his argument is valid, it is trivial or irrelevant,  s 
ince  representationalism  does  not  require  perceptual  content  to  be  determined  by 
appearances.
A version  of  this  objection  may  be  found  in  Siegel  (2010),  who  argues  that 
Travis’s  question  of  establishing  which  of  a  range  of  possible  contents  a  given 
experience  has  “seems  flawed,  driven  as  it  is  by  the  idea  that  demonstrable  [i.e. 
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visual ] looks might fix contents of experience” (ibid. 62). Siegel goes on to claim that 16
looks are “irrelevant to fixing the content of experience” (ibid.) — a claim with which 
Travis would no doubt agree. However, the argument from looks does not concern 
what  determines  p-representational  contents,  but  rather  how those  contents  may be 
recognised  by the subject such that they can ‘read off’  the face value of experiences. 
Indeed, I take it to be one of Travis’s major contributions to the debate that he draws 
attention to this distinction which has been ignored or glossed over by many other 
philosophers of perception.
The  triviality  objection  is  therefore  flawed since  it  ignores  the  central  role  of 
Availability in Travis’s argument. Indeed, the suggestion that the content of experience 
is  determined  by  something  other  than  appearances  arguably  makes  the  problem 
worse, and not better, for the representationalist (see §5.1).
4.3. The phenomenal looks objection
Perhaps the most pressing objection to Travis is, as I alluded to in response 2 above, 
that  he  neglects  to  consider  a  further  ‘non-comparative’  notion  of  looks — namely, 
phenomenal looks, or looksp. These are characterised by Jackson as
being explicitly tied to terms for color, shape, and/or distance: ‘It looks blue to me’, ‘It 
looks triangular’, ‘The tree looks closer than [sic] the house’, ‘The top line looks longer than 
the bottom line’, ‘There looks to be a red square in the middle of the white wall’, and so on. 
That is, instead of terms like ‘cow’, ‘house’, ‘happy’, we have, in the phenomenal use, 
terms like ‘red’, ‘square’, and ‘longer than’.
(Jackson 1977: 33)
 By  “demonstrable  looks”,  Travis  means  visual  appearances  demonstrably  possessed  by 16
objects that are not specific to a given subject’s experience. However, it is clear that Siegel takes 
this to mean visual looks, and Travis (2013a) subsequently drops this terminology.
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If looksp were capable of combining aspects of visual and thinkable looks such 
that  they  are  both  wholly  perceptual  and  capable  of  making  face-value  content 
recognisable, then P4 of Travis’s argument would be false, and the argument fails to go 
through.  Indeed,  Byrne  (2009)  and  Brogaard  (2010)  argue  that  Travis  himself  is 
committed to the existence of a third notion of looks, based on his definition of visual 
looks as follows:
[S]omething looks thus-and-so, or like such-and-such, where it looks the way such-and-
such, or things which are (were) thus-and-so, does (would, might) look.
(Travis 2004: 69–70)
Unpacking  the  somewhat  convoluted  grammar  of  this  passage,  it  is  apparent  that 
‘looks’ appears in both the explanandum (“looks thus-and-so, or like such-and-such”) 
and explanans (“looks the way … does”). If both occurrences referred to comparative 
looks, i.e. looksv, then Travis’s definition is circular since looksv would be defined in 
terms of themselves, generating a regress.  The latter use of ‘looks’, argue Byrne and 17
Brogaard,  must  therefore  refer  to  some  other  notion  of  looks.  Since  these  are 
presumably  not  epistemic  looks,  then Travis  is  committed to  the  existence  of  non-
comparative looks, i.e. looksp, in terms of which his other two notions may be defined.
The objection, however, is flawed. First, as discussed below, it is not clear that 
phenomenal looks are non-comparative. Second, despite Travis’s use of cognitively rich 
examples  like  “looks  like  a  Vermeer”  (ibid.  75)  or  looking  “as  if  Pia  will  sink  the 
putt” (ibid. 78), his argument equally applies to so-called visual primitives like looking 
 Strictly speaking, this is incorrect since, provided that for all Fs, lookingv F can be defined in 17
terms of lookingv G, where F and G are non-identical, and lookingv G is not itself defined in terms 
that appeal to lookingv F, then no regress is generated. This is consistent with the comparative 
analysis of looksp given below.
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blue or looking triangular — precisely the terms by which Jackson defines phenomenal 
looks.  According to Travis,  looksp  are equally susceptible to ringers — for example, 18
looking white-in-blue-light, or looking like a tetrahedron seen face-on, respectively — 
and so are similarly equivocal between contents. Moreover, it is controversial whether 
there is any such set of primitives in terms of which all  other appearances may be 
defined, and if  so,  precisely what these are.  Whilst  this is presumably an empirical 
matter that is answerable via scientific investigation of the human visual system, in the 
absence of such knowledge it is unclear how naïve subjects are supposed to be capable 
of grasping what is represented to them in experience when they are unaware of what 
the relevant primitives are.19
Travis’s  definition  of  looksv,  if  indeed it  is  such,  is  intended to  highlight  the 
essentially comparative nature of visual looks. However, we could equally replace it 
with the following Brewer-inspired definition without loss of meaning:
x  looksv  F  [to S]  iff  x  has visually relevant similarities [from S’s  point of view, under 
relevant circumstances k] to paradigm exemplars of F.
(Cf. Brewer 2006: 169)
According to Brewer (2006,  2007,  2011) and Martin (2010),  looks are grounded in a 
series  of  similarity  relations  between  objects  or  their  visually  detectible  properties. 
Thus, for something to look red,  for example, is for it possess relevant similarities to 
paradigmatically  red  things,  such  as  a  ripe  tomato  seen  in  full  daylight.  Brewer’s 
notion of a “visually relevant similarity” may in turn be cashed out in terms of the 
 Notably, Jackson, who is frequently cited as defending the existence of phenomenal looks, 18
takes these to ground a form of sense-datum theory, and not representationalism.
 See §5.1 for further discussion.19
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dispositions of  perceivers  to  judge that  two stimuli,  under contextually-determined 
circumstances k, are similar in some visually detectible respect, such as their colour or 
shape.  Importantly  for  Brewer,  perceivers  need  not  be  consciously  aware  of  such 
similarities. Rather, in order for the relevant looks to obtain, the relevant similarities 
need merely exist. Thus lookingv is not, according to Brewer, an intentional notion.
Brewer and Martin’s comparative analyses of looks may equally be applied to 
looksp. Thus, even supposed visual primitives like looking blue, looking triangular, and so 
on, can be analysed as being implicitly comparative. If this view is correct, then Byrne 
and Brogaard’s objection to Travis collapses since the terms ‘appearance’ or ‘look’ need 
not appear on the right-hand side of  the above biconditional,  thereby avoiding the 
alleged regress. More importantly for present purposes, however, Travis’s argument 
against looksv  may now be applied to looksp  which, when analysed in comparative 
terms, are similarly equivocal between contents, and so cannot satisfy Looking-indexing. 
Whether looksp are indeed comparative is therefore a substantive question that needs 
to be addressed by any proponent of the phenomenal looks objection.20
In the absence of independent grounds for preferring a non-comparative analysis 
of  looksp  over  the  more  “parsimonious”  comparative  account  (Martin  2010),  the 
argument between Travis and the representationalist remains a stand-off with the mere 
availability of the comparative analysis effectively neutralising the phenomenal looks 
objection. No doubt much more remains to be said on both sides about this kind of 
defence of Travis’s P4. However, it is clear that the phenomenal looks objection is not 
the  knock-down  response  that  Byrne  and  Brogaard  appear  to  suggest.  The 
representationalist’s  problem  is  that  the  connection  between  lookingp  ψ  and 
 For further discussion, see Martin (2010) and Brogaard (2010).20
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representing ψ cannot simply be taken for granted — for example, on semantic grounds 
— since this connection is precisely what is at issue in Travis’s argument. Consequently, 
the argument cannot be dismissed simply by appealing to phenomenal looks, since 
(a) such looks may themselves be implicitly comparative, and so equivocal, and (b) it is 
unclear how looksp are capable of making objectively assessable content available, as 
opposed to, for example, denoting a purely subjective state of the perceiver (cf. Glüer 
2009; §3.1). So, while it remains open to the representationalist to argue that a ‘non-
comparative’  or  ‘thin’  notion  of  looks  is  capable  of  making  perceptual  content 
recognisable, as per response 2, it remains to be explained how looksp  can play this 
role.
5. The Challenge for Representationalism
Setting the above misinterpretations and objections to one side, Travis’s challenge to 
the representationalist may be restated as follows:
(i) If  visual  experiences  were  p-representational,  then  their  contents  should  be 
“recognizable”, or cognitively available,  to the subject solely in virtue of their 
having the relevant experience (i.e. Availability, glossed as Availability*). Plausibly, 
this occurs on the basis of how, in experience, things appear, or look, to the subject 
(Looks-indexing).
(ii) But visual looks (looksv) are comparative, and so equivocal between a potentially 
infinite series of objectively assessable contents. Looksv are therefore incapable of 
making the  relevant  face-value  content  available.  (To  this  we might  add that 
‘thin’  or  phenomenal  looks  seem similarly  unsuited to  making such contents 
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available since (a) they too may be implicitly comparative, and (b) they arguably 
lack objective import; i.e. they are narrow contents.)
(iii) Thinkable or epistemic looks (lookst) on the other hand, draw upon the subject’s 
beliefs in a way that is incompatible with their being constitutive of perceptual 
experience, since experience is supposed to be explanatorily prior to judgement. 
Rather, lookst are perceptual ‘takings’, or “autorepresentation” in Travis’s terms, 
formed on the basis of experience, that go beyond what is perceptually available to 
the subject, and so not wholly perceptual. Moreover, the resulting contents — of 
beliefs, for example — do not themselves constitute evidence for experience being 
p-representational, since their existence is entirely compatible with the denial of 
representationalism.
Assuming, pace responses 1 and 2 above, that no further notion of looks is available, the 
representationalist now faces the following choice. Either:
(a) perceptual content is consciously available to the subject, but not in virtue of how 
things appear, or look, and so Looks-indexing is false (response 3); or
(b) perceptual content is not consciously available to the subject, and so Availability is 
false (response 4).
The  problem  with  (a)  is  that  it  remains  to  be  explained  how,  if  not  in  virtue  of 
appearances, perceptual content is consciously available to the subject. The problem 
with (b), on the other hand, is that if perceptual content is not available to the subject, 
then it is difficult to see how it can play any substantive role in relation to the subject’s 
conscious  mental  life,  thus  undermining  much  of  the  initial  motivation  for 
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representationalism. I examine each of these alternatives in turn below.
Alternatively, the representationalist might deny one of Travis’s other conditions 
for p-representation, i.e.
Response 5:  Reject Objectivity, Face Value and/or Givenness
However, this too has the effect of significantly weakening the view since each of these 
four conditions is closely connected, both with each other and with Looks-indexing.
5.1. Rejecting Looks-indexing
At  this  point,  it  might  be  objected  on  behalf  of  representationalism  that  p-
representational  content  is  not  available  ‘in  virtue  of’  any  particular  feature  of 
experience, such as appearances,  but is simply available full  stop. According to the 
resulting view, it is constitutive of perceptual representation that its content is available 
to the conscious subject, and not something that needs to be ‘added on’ after the fact — 
for example, in virtue of how things look. In fact, this objection is a version of response 
3, since it denies Looks-indexing in favour of some other way of satisfying Availability.
One worry about this suggestion is that it threatens to render the phenomenal 
character of experience superfluous in the manner of what Mark Johnston (2006: 260) 
calls  “The  Wallpaper  View”.  On  this  view,  phenomenal  character  is  a  “mere 
accompaniment” (ibid.) or by-product of experience rather than part of any mechanism 
by  which  content  is  made  manifest  to  the  subject.  This  results  in  subjects  being 
‘saddled  with’  perceptual  content  irrespective  of,  and  independently  from,  the 
phenomenology of experience. Moreover, this seems contrary to the way that many 
representationalists characterise their view as involving the ‘conveying’ (Siegel’s term) 
of content to the subject by experience,  rather than such content simply being self-
Final draft – please do not cite or quote without permission
Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks "                                                                        33
evident as with belief or judgement.
Assuming  that  the  representationalist  wishes  to  provide  some  positive  story 
about how representational content is available to the subject, if not in virtue of how 
things look, we need to distinguish between the following two questions:
1. Individuation  question:  What  determines,  or  individuates,  p-representational 
content?
2. Availability  question:  what  makes  p-representational  content  recognisable,  or 
cognitively available, to the subject?
Question 1 has attracted no shortage of  philosophical  responses:  anti-individualism 
(Burge  1979;  2010),  biosemantics  (Millikan  1993),  asymmetric  dependency  (Fodor’s 
1987),  informational  content  (Dretske’s  1994),  demonstrative  content  (Burge  1991; 
McDowell 1994; Brewer 1999), conceptual and/or discriminatory capacities (McDowell 
1994; 2008), to name but a few. By contrast, however, question 2 has barely shown up 
on  the  philosophical  radar.  This  is  problematic  because  many  of  the  factors  that 
representationalists have taken to determine or individuate the content of experience — 
distal  or  proximal  stimuli,  counterfactual  dependencies,  historical  facts  about  the 
evolution  of  the  visual  system,  and so  on — are  ones  to  which  perceivers  have  no 
independent first-personal access. Assuming that p-representation is supposed to play 
some  substantive  role  in  our  mental  lives — indeed,  if,  as  per  Face  Value,  we  are 
supposed to be able to tell or otherwise grasp how our experiences represent the world 
as being — then the representationalist must also explain how this is possible given the 
apparent  inaccessibility  of  the factors  determining perceptual  content.  That  is,  they 
must answer the availability question.
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Travis’ challenge to the representationalist, then, lies in requiring an answer to 
both of the above questions in a way that disambiguates at the conscious level between 
the multiple possible contents that perceptual experiences could have. Thus it is not 
sufficient  to  explain  what  gives  experiences  their  contents  (i.e.  the  individuation 
question),  but  one  must  also  explain  how  it  is  possible  for  those  contents  to  be 
cognitively  available  to  the  subject  (the  availability  question).  Moreover,  in  order  to 
constitute an argument for representationalism, the resulting explanation must be one 
that  favours  the  view  over  alternative  explanations,  such  as  a  purely  relational 
(Campbell 2002) or object-based (Brewer 2006) view of experience, or Naïve Realism 
(Martin 2002, 2006; Kalderon 2007).
While both representationalists and anti-representationalists accept a role for the 
existence of  mental  content,  they differ  as to whether this  should be thought of  as 
occurring within perceptual experience or judgement, respectively. A further difficulty 
for  the  representationalist,  then,  is  that  whatever  explanation  they  give  for  how 
experiences get their contents such that those very contents are consciously available to 
the perceiver, can, in many cases, be co-opted by the anti-representationalist to explain 
how the corresponding perceptual judgements or beliefs get their contents. This in turn 
highlights  an  important  commonality  between  these  apparently  competing  views 
concerning the tokening of mental content that places the emphasis upon the nature 
and functioning of what we might call perceptual discriminatory capacities, whether 
these are operative at the level of experience, as the representationalist would have it, 
or in judgement or belief,  as the anti-representationalist claims. Whether any of the 
standard representationalist views can satisfy these constraints — and indeed how anti-
representationalists  themselves  solve  the  problem  of  tokening  belief-contents — 
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therefore constitute important and under-explored questions that arise directly from 
Travis’s argument from looks.
5.2. Rejecting Availability
The denial of Availability, i.e. response 4, is compatible with representational content 
forming part  of  a  causal  explanation of  the sub-personal  mechanism of  perception, 
such as one might find in neuroscience, for example. It  does not,  however, support 
representationalism  as  it  is  here  formulated,  since  the  resulting  contents  are  not 
constitutive of any conscious experiential state.  Indeed, this threatens to undermine 21
the very basis of representationalism, since, as Travis might put it, if it is not apparent 
to me what my experiences represent, then in what sense can they be said to represent 
anything at all, and to whom? The point here is not that only conscious agents may be 
represented  to,  but  that  what  appeared  to  be  a  familiar  metaphor   of  experiences 
‘representing’ various states of the world, or external objects, to the subject has now 
been replaced by a much weaker, quasi-technical notion of representation that is quite 
distinct  from conscious  experience.  This  severely  limits  the  explanatory  role  of  the 
relevant  content,  potentially  collapsing  perceptual  representation  into  mere  sub-
personal effect-representation.
This highlights the nature of Travis’s challenge to representationalism as not so 
much concerning the existence of perceptual content as its explanatory role. On the one 
hand,  intentionalism  emphasises  the  role  of  perceptual  content  in  explaining  the 
phenomenal character, or phenomenology, of experience. However, it is doubtful that 
the resulting content can extend beyond this to represent the states and properties of 
external  objects,  thus  yielding  a  form of  ‘thin’  or  narrow content.  Such  a  view is, 
 For a representational view of this kind, see Burge (2010).21
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according to Travis, incompatible with the role of p-representation in informing us how 
the world is, or in justifying our beliefs and judgements about anything beyond the 
subjective  character  of  experience  itself.  The  epistemic  or  justificatory  role  of  p-
representation, on the other hand, requires that contents be assessable with respect to 
worldly objects and their properties, and so has objective purport. However, it is not 
clear how it is possible for such content to be cognitively available to the subject on the 
basis  of  perception  alone.  Thus  the  representationalist’s  explanation  of  perceptual 
phenomenology and the epistemic role of p-representation appear to be in tension with 
each other. Indeed, it is precisely this tension between visual and thinkable looks that is 
captured by the argument from looks. Whether it can be reconciled will depend upon 
precisely what one takes the explanatory role, or roles, of perceptual content to be.
To  give  a  decisive  argument  in  favour  of  representationalism,  then,  its 
proponents must either (a) identify some unique role that the representational content 
of experience is supposed to play which cannot be adequately explained, or is superior 
to the explanation given,  by their  anti-representationalist  opponents,  or  (b)   identify 
some distinctive mechanism by which experiential contents are tokened such that they 
are cognitively available to the perceiver, but which cannot in turn be co-opted by the 
anti-representationalist to explain the content of the resulting perceptual judgements or 
beliefs. I am aware of no such views in current philosophy of perception. However, 
that is not to say that such a view could not be devised — for example, by focusing 
upon the operation of perceptual discriminatory capacities that both token and make 
perceptual  contents  consciously  available.  Thus,  while  identifying  a  number  of 
important  constraints  upon  the  notion  and  explanatory  role(s)  of  p-representation, 
Travis’s argument falls short of ruling out its existence entirely.
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6. Conclusion
Despite  its  intuitive  appeal,  the  claim that  perceptual  experience  is  in  some  sense 
representational  is  neither  obviously  nor  trivially  true.  Whilst  I  have  argued  that 
Travis’s argument from looks does not entirely rule out this possibility, it does provide 
a useful way of sharpening the nature of the disagreement between representationalists 
and their opponents, as well as hinting at a possible reconciliation centring upon the 
role of perceptual discriminatory capacities in tokening and providing access to the 
contents of experience and/or belief.
By highlighting the various theoretical commitments and explanatory roles that 
representationalists  have  taken  perceptual  content  to  satisfy,  Travis  places  pressure 
upon the suggestion that all of these can be played by a single such content, if indeed 
they can be satisfied at all. This in turn highlights the need for greater clarity about the 
precise explanatory role, or roles, of such content; i.e. not only what it represents, but at 
which  level  (e.g.  personal  or  sub-personal),  and precisely  how this  is  supposed to 
explain phenomenal character, the content of belief, epistemic justification, and so on, 
or  some  combination  thereof.  Moreover,  in  order  to  constitute  an  argument  for 
representationalism, this must be done in a way that genuinely favours the view over a 
parallel  anti-representationalist  explanation  of  the  contents  of  perceptual  beliefs  or 
judgements.  To  do  so  requires  considerably  more  argumentation  than  Travis’s 
opponents have yet provided. To that extent, Travis’s argument from looks remains a 
serious  challenge  to  a  wide  range  of  views  that  appeal  to  the  existence  of 
representational content in perceptual experience.
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